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Two years ago Professor Karl Pribram expressed his
conviction that the present partition of the world between
East and West is, in the final analysis, the outgrowth of a
philosophical difference that is traceable to the days of Plato
and which reached its climax, although by no means its end,
in the scholastic disputes concerning Universals.' The funda-
mental dichotomy of thought, according to Pribram, is repre-
sented on the one hand by those who believe in the identity
of thinking and being, who recognize a real existence, outside
the human mind, of general ideas or universal concepts, and
who give credence to the ability of the human mind to
understand the laws by which the universe is governed.2
Because of its belief in the reality of ideas or universals,
this school of thought has been designated Realism or Uni-
versalism. On the other hand there are those who deny that
the mind can grasp the truth directly and, hence, insist that
universal concepts are mere abstractions, products of the
mind with no corresponding reality in the outside world.
Since, for these thinkers universals are mere names, nomina,
their school has come to be known as Nominalism. Human
reasoning, they conclude, must be based on hypothetical
assumptions ' with all the consequences of tolerance, Rela-
tivism and Subjectivism these assumptions entail. These two
patterns of thought have, during the course of intellectual
history, entered into a variety of combinations. Pribram
elaborates on two of these combinations, calling them the
intuitional and dialectic patterns.'
1 PRIBRAM, CONFLICTING PATTERNS op THOUGHT (1949). The importance of
this book for political theory has not yet been sufficiently recognized.
2 Id. at2,7.
3 Id. at 2, 11. For a concise presentation of the problems involved and the
history of the dispute, see De Wulf, Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism, 11
CATH. ENCYC. 90 (1913).
4 PRiRAm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3, 21, 36 et seq.
(360)
THE NATURAL LAW
Anyone who, with Pribram's thesis in mind, has followed
the recently revived dispute between the Natural Law school
and the adherents of positive law,' undoubtedly ponders the
question whether his dichotomy underlies the dispute in
political philosophy. This paper attempts to consider the
conflict between Natural Law and legal Positivism by pro-
jecting it against the background of the various theories
of knowledge evolved during the periods of Hellenic and
Hellenistic thought. Because of limited space, a discussion
of medieval and modern views must be omitted, although
some arguments will be brought forward in the light of
historical study and recent experience.'
I.
Plato and the Sophists
The juxtaposition of Natural Law and legal positivism
was first formulated scientifically in the controversy between
Plato and the Sophists. Although the latter did not have a
uniform school of thought either in metaphysics or ethics,7
we know from Plato's writings at least one definite Sophistic
trend as developed by Protagoras. In The Theaetetus the
5 See Wormuth, Return to the Middle Ages, 2 WEsT. PoL. Q. 202 (1949);
Kelsen, The Natural Law Doctrine Before The Tribunal of Science, 2 WEST. PoL.
Q. 481 (1949). Bodenheimer, The Natural Law Doctrine Before The Tribunal of
Science: A Reply To Hans Kelsen, 3 WEsT. PoL. Q. 335 (1950). For additional
references, see note 86, infra.
6 Application to political thought is briefly indicated by PazmRAM, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 89. The few essays and books that deal with the philosophical
foundation of the Natural Law theory such as KELsEN, note 86 infra; LE
BOUTILIR, AmERCAN DEmOCRACY AND NATURAL LAW (1950); Chroust, On Tire
Nature of Natural Law in INTEPRETATIONS or MODER LEGAL Pniosopmms
70 et seq. (Sayre ed. 1947); Oppenheim, Relativism, Absolutism and Democracy,
44 Ams. PoL. Scr. REv. 951 et seq. (1950), do not go into the epistemological
background. The only book that does so is SAuTER, Dia PHmOsopniscw
GRUNDLAGEN DES NATU 1RETS (1932), to which the writer of this article is
indebted. Naturally Sauter could not take into account Pribram's theories. The
thesis that epistemological and political doctrines are logically interrelated is
expressly denied by Oppenheim, supra at 959.
7 JAEGR, 1 PAmDFjA 292 et seq. (2d ed. 1945), distinguishes on the basis of
their educational philosophy three schools of Sophists, of which Protagoras
represents one. Jaeger warns, id. at 294, however, against generalizing and over-
estimating the ideas put forth by Protagoras.
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followers of Protagoras are said to "speak of justice and
injustice . . . as having no natural or essential basis." 8
Truth they hold to be a matter of agreement by the political
community or the State. This most extreme positivistic atti-
tude is corroborated by two similar passages.' At the same
time, Protagoras is the father of Relativism, the famous
dictum, "Man is the measure of all things," being attributed
to him.'0 Epistemologically he approaches Nominalism.
Truth, for him, exists only in relation to the person who
asserts it, and there is no true reality except in the cognizant
mind." For him there is no absolute; truth can be estab-
lished only by sense perception.'" Thus Protagoras is the
classical example of Relativism in epistemology coinciding
with Positivism in law, a combination that has been affirmed
repeatedly by Kelsen. 3
On the other hand, Plato's Socrates is the representative
of the belief in absolute ideas and, at the same time, the
S PLATO, THEAETrrus 172 b (Jowett's transl. 1892).
9 Id. at 172 a and 167 c. SAuTER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 199, denies that
these sentences prove Protagoras' Positivism; he quotes them as testifying to the
latter's Natural Law theory. The difference seems to be one of text, translation
and interpretation. Concurring with the text above are FREYTAG, DIE ENTWICX-
LUNG DER GRIECHISCHEN ERKENNTNISTHEORIE BIS ARISTOTELES 21 (1905); PoHiF.NZ,
STAATSGEDANXE UND STAATSLEHRE DER GIEmc'N 38 (1923); JAEGER, op. cit. supra
note 7; Kelsen, Metamorphoses of the Idea of Justice in INTERPRETATIONS OF MOD-
ERN L- GL PnmosopHixs 418 (Sayre ed. 1947). HIE]INN, Nomos uND PHYSis
110 et seq., 116 (1945), is also in agreement. For an absolutely unambiguous
statement of Positivism imputed to the Sophists in general, see PLATO, LAWS
889 e (Jowett's transl. 1892): "[They would say] that the principles of justice
have no existence at all in nature but that mankind is always disputing about
them and altering them, and that the alterations which are made by art and
by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at
the time at which they are made."
10 PLATO, THEAETUS 152 a (Jowett's transl. 1892). Against this statement
Plato says emphatically in the LAws 716 c: "God is the measure of all things."
11 For Protagoras' Relativism see GROTE, ARISTOTLE 431 (3d ed. 1883);
GROiE, PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANiONs OF SOCRATES 325 et seq. (1865). See
also BEARE, G'EEsx THEORIES OF ELEuMNTARY COGNITION 214 et seq. (1906).
12 CATLIN, THE STORY OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS 30 (1939); FREYTAG,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 20 et seq.; NATORP, FORSCHUNGEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES
ERKENNTNISPROBLEMS Im ALTERTUm 22, 47 (1884); PRANTL, GESCHICHTE DER
LOGIK im ABENDLANDE I 12 et seq. (1855); dissenting, SAUTER, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 200.
13 KF.SEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 396 et seq. (1949); KELSEN,
VoM WESEN UND WERT DER DEMOERATIE 103 (1929); Kelsen, Absolutism and
Relativism in Philosophy and Politics, 42 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 906, 911 (1948).
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early champion of Natural Law. Plato's doctrine of ideas
is too well known to merit detailed description. Suffice it to
say that for him universal ideas alone have reality; they
alone can be the subject of cognition (but perception is not
a means to cognition as the Sophists claim); they are per-
manent, absolute and independent of the changing physical
world; 14 they alone have substance (ousia), and it is by
participation in the general ideas that the phenomena of
this world acquire their particular essence and existence.' 5
This doctrine is known as exaggerated Realism and is ex-
pressed in the medieval formula universalia sunt ante rem."
A specific application of this doctrine is Plato's theory of
Natural Law manifested in his search for justice. The latter
is an absolute idea like beauty and good "7 and can be
apprehended by those who adhere to the true philosophy."8
Frequently it is referred to as that which is "by nature
just"; 1' the Natural Law, in contrast to the conventional
and the written law, is described as the juxtaposition of
physis and nomos which traverses the entire Platonic era
and beyond.2 ° The Republic, having the search for justice
as its main subject, depicts the ideal State in which there is
practically no need for laws 21 because the rulers are at the
same time philosophers and, therefore, know what is just.2"
That is, they rule by Natural Law. Justice is rather formally
defined as the condition of "doing one's own business," 23
14 Plato's theory of ideas, which is closely linked with his theory of knowl-
edge and his tenet of the immortality of the soul is expressed in CRATYLuS 439 a
et seq.; PHAEso 65 b, 67 b; REPUBLIC 514 a et seq.; Syiuosarm, passim;
TEmAsEmus 186 a et seq.; Timaeus 29 b, 34 b. In MENo 85 e et seq. he develops
the theory of innate ideas.
15 "By beauty all beautiful things become beautiful." PHAEDo 100 c.
16 For an excellent, concise but substantial description, see GROTE, ARISTOTLE
553 et seq. (3d ed. 1883).
17 PHAmo 65 b et seq.; PARMENIES 130 b et seq.
18 SEVENTH EPIsTLE 326 b.
19 REPUBLic 501 b.
20 See the thorough philological study by EtImEANN, op. cit. supra note 9.
21 REPUBLIC 425 c et seq. enumerates the various fields of civil, criminal and
procedural law where the need for written laws is denied.
22 REPUBLIC 473 d, 540 a et seq.; SEvENm EPsST 326 b.
23 REPuB-'c 433 d.
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for if every class and every member of the class does the
work assigned him, the entire State will achieve happiness.24
And happiness is the basis of Plato's social ethics. To achieve
it, he builds a rigid political hierarchy, static as in all Utopias
where no one is permitted to change his place in society.
This pattern has been identified with the Natural Law
theory as such, and the latter has therefore been marked
as authoritarian and reactionary.2" In so doing, the fact has
been overlooked that Plato's Republic corresponds exactly
to his exaggerated Realism as outlined above; it is from his
ontology that his exaggerated theory of Natural Law fol-
lows. As is well known, in his later works he compromised.
Although he holds the government of wise men to be better
than that of laws,26 because laws must be general and can-
not do justice to the individual case,27 Plato concedes that
in the absence of the perfect ruler and because of the im-
perfection of man,2" laws are necessary.29 Yet, the State
where positive law rules is only the second best,3" and the
wise statesman can at any time deviate from the written
law,"' because the written law is only the image of the true
law.32 Positive law is the worldly phenomenon of Natural
Law and as such is not real. This is why it must serve the
general welfare,33 that is, it must be under the guidance of
Natural Law. For apportioning to the citizen that "which
according to reason and art is the most just" " is the one
great rule the wise statesman must observe.
24 Id. at 420 b et seq.
25 Wormuth, Return to the Middle Ages, 2 WEST. Po. Q. 202 (1949).
26 STATESmAN 294 a.
27 Id. at 294 b, 295 b.
28 This is an anticipation of St. Augustine's thesis that the foundation of
the State is caused by the fall of man.
29- STATES A 301 d, e; LAWS 874 d, 875 d.
30 STATESM"A 297 e, 301 d; LAWS 875 d.
31 STATESMAN 296 d, e; but not arbitrarily: LAWS 714 a et seq.
32 STATESmAx 300 C.
33 LAWS 715 b.





When Aristotle attacked the theory of ideas put forth by
his teacher Plato, he by no means denied the existence of
universals. He only denied their being prior to and separate
from particulars. This he did in a negative way by refuting
Plato's theory in a number of arguments,3" and in a positive
way by advancing his own theory of categories. Of the ten
categories he established, he ascribed substance (ousia)
only to the first one, the concrete individual thing, and
placed what according to Plato was the essence of a thing,
that is its quality, in the third category.36 It is here that he
differs from Plato's teachings." For Aristotle, reality belongs
to the individual thing or person, and the general idea exists
only in or along with the particular.38 This doctrine is funda-
mentally opposed to Plato's Realism, but it is Realism never-
theless, inasmuch as it does attribute reality to ideas. There-
fore, it is called moderate Realism and is expressed in the
formula universalia sunt in re.39 It is generally recognized
today that, in spite of the important differences in their
metaphysics, Aristotle throughout his life remained basically
a disciple of Plato.4"
It is therefore not surprising that we find expressions of
Positivism as well as Natural Law in Aristotle's writings,
although there is no doubt that he is fundamentally a Nat-
ural Law theorist and that the few positivistic statements,4
35 MErAPiysics 987 b 6 et seq., 990 b 8 et seq., 1028 b 18, 1038 b 6.
36 CATGORIEs, 2 a 11, 2 b 10. See GROTE, AssToLE, c. iii, 67 (3d ed. 1883).
37 GROTE, op. cit. supra note 36, App. I, 563.
38 For a full discussion see GROTE, op. cit. supra note 36, App. I, 558 et seq.
Although the authenticity of the CAxaous is no longer undisputed, it is recog-
nized that they contain Aristotle's teachings. FmEYTAG, op. cit. supra note 9, at 89;
JAEGER, ARmsTOTELEs:GRUNDLEGUNG EINER GESCHICHTE SEINER ENTWICKLUNG
45 (1923).
39 MTrx PHYscs 1038 b 16 contains the clearest expression of this formula.
40 DILTHEY, EIELEITUNG 3N DIE GEISTESWiSSENSCHAYTEN 258 et seq. (1883);
JAEGER, op. cit. supra note 38, at 404-5; SAUTER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 27,
with extensive literature.
41 NiCO3MACEAN EThics 1129 b 12 (Chase's transl. 1890): "By lawful we
understand what have been defined by the legislative power and each of these
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like the various contradictory passages in his Metaphysics,
do not seriously affect his Natural Law doctrine. This theory
divides the law of the State into the legal (nomikon) and the
natural (physikon) law, the latter having the same force
everywhere similar to the "fire that burns in Greece as well
as in Persia." Physikon is independent of opinion and recep-
tion, whereas individual laws do not rest on nature but on
convention and enactment.42 Natural Law is also called the
universal (koinos) law and written law the particular
(idios),4" a clear parallel to the theory of ideas. It is to the
Natural Law that man must - and can, for that matter -
appeal when the positive law is insufficient, as is illustrated
by Sophocles' Antigone: "The law that is neither of' today
nor of yesterday but eternal and whose origin is unknown,"
but which, as Aristotle says, all men divine.44 Natural Law
is sometimes called equitable 4' and seems to be the source
of equity, though not identical to it. The latter is meant to
fill the gaps of the written law which is necessarily general
and unable to adjust itself to meet every individual case.46
In discussing equity as a means to correct the flaws and
faults of the written law, Aristotle anticipates a principle of
interpretation that has become famous through adoption
by one of the most modern civil law codes - that is, the
principle that the omission of the written law ought to be
filled by ruling as the lawmaker himself would rule if he
were present, or as he would have ruled if he had foreseen
we say is just." PoLIncs 1253 a 37: "Justice is a thing of the state. For the law
is the order of the political community, and the law determines what is just."
(Author's translation.) Jowett's translation is not correct. See BARTHELmy-SAMnT-
HnLmnaR 9 (1874): "La justice est une nfcessit6 sociale, car le droit est la
rfgle de l'association politique, et la decision du juste est ce qui constitue le droit."
Similar is Rolfe's translation (1921).
42 NxcommAcZiAN ETHIcs 1134 b 18-1135 a 15.
43 RnETORic 1368 b 7.
44 Id. at 1373 b 6, 1375 b 1.
45 Id. at 1375 a31.
46 Id. at 1374 a 26; NICOrACirEAN ETHics 1137 a 31-1138 a 3.
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the case at hand.47 It is obvious that such a gap-filling rule




Thus far, we have been able to follow Pribram's "Patterns
of Thought" without difficulty. Perplexities arise, however,
when we come to the Stoics. Their physical theory of the
universe was materialistic sensualism; everything, including
God and the soul, was matter, and only matter was real.
Consequently, sensation was the only source of perception,
and the general concepts, of which the Stoics were well
aware, could not possibly be real, but existed only in the
human mind.4 Therefore, the Stoics are held by different
authors to have been either nominalists " or conceptua-
lists,50 a distinction which is of no particular importance to
us as in either case universals are considered unreal. Stoicism
imagined the human mind at birth to be a tabula rasa on
which sense perceptions were impressed as on a wax pad
(Zeno, Cleanthes). This theory was revived and popular-
ized by Locke. Through experience and analogy, the Stoics
taught, the human mind forms "natural concepts of univer-
sals," 52 whose truth is confirmed when they are generally
recognized. 3 Among these, ethical concepts such as good
and evil assume a special significance, because it is with
reference to them that Chrysippus speaks of "implanted
ideas." " This expression caused some scholars to conclude
47 Nico-ArcHnEAN ETmics 1137 b 19. See Swiss Cim CoDE art. 1, § 2 (1907).
48 PoHr.NZ, STOA UND STOIXER 36, 37 (1950).
49 PRANTL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 416, 427; ZEL.R, Tnn SToics, EPI.
cUAN~s Am ScEPIcs 83 (1870).
50 De Wulf, supra note 3. In accord is STocK, SToiclsnr 26 (1908).
51 DAViDSON, THE SToIc CREED 66 et seq. (1907); POHLENZ, 1 Dm SToA
56 et seq. (1948).
52 These are called "anticipations" (prolepseis); LAERTrus, DE vrris . . .
CLARORUm PinoSopORUm, VII, i, 54. The statement is attributed to Chrysippus.
G3 PoHn Emz, op. cit. supra note 48, at 38. Also see BARTH, DiE STOA 51, 52
(5th ed., Goedeckemeyer, 1941).
54 3 SToIcORuMr VETinRua FRAGEwNTA [hereinafter S.V.F.] No. 69 (Arnim
coll. 1903).
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that the early Stoics believed in innate ideas, at least in the
field of ethics.55 It is difficult to see how innate ideas, of
whatever content, could have a place in a philosophy of
monistic materialism which by its nature denies independent
reality to general concepts. The prevailing school of
thought,56 therefore, holds that, to the Stoics of that period,
what was "implanted" was not the concept but the predis-
position and ability of the mind to form and develop this
concept.57 This constituted the theory of the early Stoics
whose last representative was Chrysippus (c. 280-c. 208
B.C.). During the Roman period, however, especially with
Epictetus, a reversion to Platonism took place and general
concepts again assumed the character of innate ideas.58 It is
doubtful whether one can properly follow the path of
Barth " and say that the "natural universals" of Chrysippus
are hypothetical ideas. Hypothetical reasoning is character-
istic of Nominalism,6" self-evident truths are not. However,
the "generally recognized" concepts of the early Stoics are
not identical to self-evident truths. Their evidence is based
on the "general consent of mankind," which is "the index
of their truth." 61 Also, there seems to be a certain empirical
element in this pattern of thought.
When we examine the Natural Law theory of the Stoics,
we find practically no difference from that of Plato or Aris-
totle. Chrysippus is reported to have said that the law
(dikaion) is in nature and not in enactment. 62 He recognized
no other origin of justice than God and universal nature.
6 3
55 E.g., SAUTER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 51.
56 BART, op. cit. supra note 53, at 51; DAVSDSON, op. cit. supra note 51, at
69, 70; PoHLENz, 1 DiE SToA 58 (1941); PoHsz, op. cit. supra note 48, at 41;
ZELLER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 79.
57 For details see PoHLEmz, GRUNDFRAGEN DER STOISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE 84,
92 et seq. (1940).
58 BARTH, op. cit. supra note 53, at 197.
59 Id. at 59.
60 PRIBRAM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2, 12.
61 SENECA, EPIsLE 117, quoted by DAVIDSON, op. cit. supra note 51, at 69.
62 LaERTrs, op. cit. supra note 52, at 128; 3 S.V.F., op. cit. supra note 54,
No. 308.
63 3 S.N.F., op. cit. supra note 54, No. 326.
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Later Cicero elaborated on Stoic teachings. Positive law, as
he illustrates in detail, is by no means always just; '4 as a
matter of fact, it is frequently most unjust, and the only
means of distinguishing between good and bad laws is the
rule of nature.6 5 The "true law is right reason, in agreement
with nature, diffused among all men, unchanging and
eternal." 6 All of these statements could have been made by
Aristotle or even Plato. Some of the Stoic doctrines became





Are we, then, to conclude that our basic pattern, Nomi-
nalism and legal Positivism on the one hand, Realism and
Natural Law on the other, is impaired? As for the early
Stoics, the answer is in the affirmative. They confront us
with a nominalistic epistemology which, with the help of
implanted but not innate ideas, produces a genuine Natural
Law doctrine. It is patent that, from the standard of strict
consistency, the two areas of their philosophy are incompati-
ble. This fact - and the prevailing influence of Platonism -
is perhaps the reason why the later Stoics replaced the gen-
eral concepts with innate ideas, thus returning to Platonic
Realism. For while the belief in innate ideas is not essential
to Realism, that is, to moderate Realism as the examples of
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas show, the mere existence of
this belief categorically excludes Nominalism. The Stoic at-
tempt to reconcile a nominalistic epistemology and a realistic
theory of Natural Law was repeated by Locke whose theory
64 CICERO, I DE LEGius 15, 42; 3 S.V.F., op. cit. supra note 54, No. 319.
65 CICERO, I DE Laarmus 16, 43; 3 S.V.F., op. cit. supra note 54, No. 321.
66 III DE RE PUBLICA 33; 3 S.V.F., op. cit. supra note 54, No. 325.
67 The Roman definition calls jurisprudence the divinarum atque hunanarum
rerum notitia. See UPiLiW 1, I REauIARum; [Justinian] DIGEST I, 1, 10, 2;
[Justinian] INS UTius I, 1, 1. See Chroust, The Function of Law and Justice
in the Ancient World and the Middle Ages, 7 J. HiST. or IDEAS 298, 307 n.29
(1946). In DIGEST I, iii .2, the jurist Marcianus expressly refers to Chrysippus.
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of knowledge is nominalistic,6" while his Natural Law doc-
trine is a priori and rationalistic.69 Such occasional contra-
dictions, however, do not vitiate Pribram's basic pattern of
division which can be traced throughout the Middle Ages.
Here the Natural Law theory reached its climax with
Thomas Aquinas " whose theory of knowledge is in com-
plete agreement with Aristotle's moderate Realism." In
William of Ockham, a nominalist,7 2 on the other hand, the
Positivism of the Middle Ages finds its renewed expression,
not in the denial of Natural Law, but in its thesis that
Natural Law has its derivation from the will of God as a
mere divine command independent of reason.
7 3
A discussion of the place which Soviet Russia holds in
the struggle between Natural Law and Positivism would
require a more thorough investigation than is possible within
the scope of this paper. As Pribram points out, dialectic
materialism, the official Soviet pattern of thought, has a
strong affinity to Realism."4 Although denying the existence
of innate ideas, this school affirms the ability of the human
mind to grasp absolute truth and to understand the opera-
tion of antagonistic forces in the universe and in human
society. One can readily appreciate how such ideology would
help to build a social structure where an 6lite makes the law
68 Universals "belong not to the real existence of things but are the inventions
and creatures of the understanding." LocKE, 3 ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 3, 11 (1824). See also 2 ESSAY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 9, 11
(1824). But see GIBSON, LociCE's TREoRY OF KNOWLEDGE 322 (1917); SABINE,
A HISTORY OF POuTICAL THEORY 529 (1950); Simon, John Locke, 45 AM. PoL.
ScI. REv. 390, 398 (1951).
69 LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CiviL GOVERNMENT XI 135 (1690). This
treatise was written several years prior to his ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDER-
STANDING.
70 ST. THOMAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I. IIae, quaest. 91, art. 2, quaest. 94,
quaest. 95, art. 4.
71 Id., I. Iae, quaest. 84, art. 3.
72 Cf. Turner, William of Ockham, 15 CATH. ENCYC. 636 (1913). The medie-
val formula for Nominalism is universalia post rem.
73 GIERxE, PoLIcAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 173 (Maitland's transl.
1938) ; SABINE, op. cit. supra note 68, at 306.
74 PRIBRAM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36 et seq.
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according to its own idea of justice." This "6lite situation"
will be even more necessary after the state has "withered
away" - a Marxist-Leninist ideal which, although indefi-
nitely postponed in 1939,76 has not been entirely abandoned,
at least not in theory. Russian legal tradition to be sure,
like 19th and 20th century German legal thought, has been
positivistic.7 7 But the very fact that the validity of Soviet
laws is conditioned upon the consent of the Party 78 and that
the politically suspect are outside the pale of law and left
to the mercy of the secret police reveals the rule of a dis-
torted "equity" in the Aristotelian sense.
V.
The Case against Positivism
Many contemporary students of the problem discussed in
this paper, unless they chance to be followers of Thomas
Aquinas, will give preference to the nominalistic school.
This does not mean, however, that they will want to discard
justice as an essential part of law. The ramifications of
Kelsen's "pure theory of law" as treated below seem to
make some supra-legal, though not extra-juridical, standard
imperative. Furthermore, some of the reproaches leveled
at the Natural Law theory by Kelsen are unwarranted.
In the first place, positivist identification of Natural Law
with authoritarianism must be refuted. Wormuth's separa-
tion of Natural Law from the doctrine of natural rights 7
is untenable. Although Natural Law philosophers have fre-
quently used their doctrine in favor of the powers that be,
it is also true that from the time of the Stoics the claim for
75 Cf. MooRE, Sovier PoLrrcs: THE DnmImA or PoWER; THE ROLE oF
IDEAS IN SoCIAL CMO, 236 (1950).
76 Id. at 224; PRiBRAm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 48.
77 SCiLESINGER, SoviEr LEGAL THEORY, ITS SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND DEvELoP-
IfENT 3, 243 (1945).
78 Id. at 245.
79 Wormuth, supra note 25, at 203.
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equality and human rights has been part of Natural Law.8"
Medieval law, which was Natural Law, implied not only
support of, but also limitations upon, the ruler, thus pro-
tecting ruler and ruled alike."1 It even developed an elabo-
rate doctrine of the right to resist the ruler who overstepped
his limitations.82 Furthermore, it is difficult to understand
how one can deny that individual rights have emerged from
Natural Law." In Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Govern-
ment, Natural Law and individual human rights are com-
bined, and Locke directly influenced the authors of the
Declaration of Independence 84 as well as earlier American
political writers.8 " The reference in the famous passage of
the Declaration to "self-evident truths" clearly indicates
the impact of a priori thinking. The Natural Law doctrine
underlying the American Revolution may be "unscientific,"
but no one can dispute that it has made history.
As for Kelsen's attacks,86 it must be submitted that his
own "theory of pure law" stands on questionable grounds.
According to his teachings, positive law derives its authority
not from its mere existence - since it has no substantive
justification - but from the existence (legitimate or illegiti-
mate) of the lawmaker, whose authority is delegated from
the "original constitution." 'T This presupposed "original
80 Cf. (Justinian] INSTITUTES I, ii, 2: "lure enim naturali omnes homines ab
initio liberi nascebantur."
81 Kern, Recht und Verfassung im "Mittelalter, 120 HISTORIsCHE ZEITSCHRr
45 et seq. (1919).
82 KERN, GOTTESGNADENTUM UND WMERSTANDSRECHT Il FRUHEREN MITTEL-
ALTER (1914) passim.
83 Cf. CATLIN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 274; LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND Humm RIGHTS 73-89, 95 et seq., 111 et seq. (1950).
84 WRIGHT, AmaIcAx INTERPRETATIONS or NATURAL LAW 10 (1931).
85 Id. at 46, 65 et seq. See also id. at 329, 330 and 341, where Wright speaks
of the individual rights phase of natural law.
. 86 Kelsen's monograph, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtstehre
und des Rechtspositivismus (1929), can be found in 1 20TH Cs auxY LEGAI. PHIL-
osopry SERIES: KEsEN, GEuNRAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 391 (Wedberg's
transl. 1945); Appendix, Metamorphoses of the Idea of Justice in INT-RPETATIONS
OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 390 et seq. (Sayre ed. 1947); Kelsen, The
Natural Law Doctrine before the Tribunal of Science, 2 WEST. PoL. Q. 481 (1949).
87 Kelsen, Die philosophischenr Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und der
Rechtspositivismus (1929), found in 1 20m CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPH SERIES:
KEISEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 396 (Wedberg's transl. 1945).
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constitution" or "basic norm" must be something similar to
Aristotle's "unmoved mover," an a priori before which
there was nothing.88 Compared to this notion, Plato's "real
ideas" do not seem far beyond comprehension. Inasmuch
as Kelsen considers valid any positive law that stands the
test of delegation,89 he renounces the legal, though not the
moral, right to protest unjust laws. This is because the
concept of an "unjust law" has no meaning in Positivism.
However, there exists no objective standard of good and
evil outside the positive law,"0 and if justice is an irrational
ideal,9 then, to cite only one absurd consequence, men and
women who married in violation of the racial laws of the
Nazis should have been barred from entrance into the
United States - for in the eyes of the government from
which they had fled, they were common criminals. Augus-
tine's famous comparison of the State without justice to a
robbers' gang 92 is certainly lost to the disciples of Posi-
tivism.
The "pure theory of law" also leads to rather unsatis-
factory results in the interpretation of law. If it is true
that no legal criterion exists for finding the right interpre-
tation of a norm the meaning of which is ambiguous,93 then
the decisions of judges are primarily political in nature.94
This deprives the legal scholar - whose task it is to inter-
pret the law - of the function and authority he has had
throughout the centuries. The unfortunate results of such a
88 It should be noticed that this source of validity is missing in international
law. The source of the latter is seen in Christian Wolff's civitas maxima, whose
nature Kelsen admits to be of Natural Law character; cf. his DAS PROBLEM DER
SouvRAESrAxr uND DIE THEoRiE DES VOE RmuCHTS 252 (1928).
89 Kelsen, supra note 87, at 394.
90 For an extensive rejection of this opinion see Bodenheimer, The
Natural Law Doctrine before the Tribunal of Science: A Reply to Hans Kelsen,
3 WEST. Po.. Q. 335, 345 et seq. (1950).
91 Kelsen, supra note 87, at 13; Metamorphoses of the Idea of Justice in
INTERP TATIONS or MODERN LEGAL Pn osop=s 397 (Sayre ed. 1947).
92 ST. AuousrnE, DE CivITATE Dns IV, 4. See also CicERo, Dr LEGiBUs
I, 15, 42 in 3 S.V.F., op. cit. supra note 54, No. 319.
93 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L.Q. Ray. 474, 525 (1934), as quoted
by Bodenheimer, supra note 90, at 341 n.22.
94 Kelsen, THE LAW Or THE UNITED NATiONS xiii et seq. (1950).
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polity can be seen in Kelsen's statements on the Charter
of the United Nations. His commentary, certainly the work
of a great scholar, loses much of its potential value through
its underlying theory of interpretation. 5 Any person who
has practiced law either as an attorney or as a judge, knows
that a decision based on "right reason" is more important
to the parties concerned - and it is for them that the law
exists - than a masterly opinion written in a learned and
literary style. In continental Europe the ability to reach a
decision based on "right reason," that is, to see where justice
lies in a given case, is called iudicium; and the quality of
a lawyer, especially while he is studying the profession, is
judged according to his iudicium. This is not an irrational
or arbitrary state of mind, but rather an inherent char-
acteristic of any good jurist who must find a just solution
to the case. True, it presupposes the existence of justice
and the possibility of its realization, however imperfect in
this imperfect world of ours.96
Positivists have repeatedly claimed that the concept of
justice in Plato, Aristotle and throughout the Hellenistic
and medieval periods, whenever defined, had no significant
content. 7 As far as classical definitions are concerned, this
criticism is certainly justified in view of the fact that this
concept had to be stated in its worst generalized form. How-
ever, this does not mean that Natural Law has no content
whatever. Medieval and modern authors,98 have tried to
formulate, in detail, the law that is "natural" to all civilized
95 Ibid. passim. Kelsen's frequent conclusions, "the opposite interpretation is
not excluded" or "not impossible" (e.g., id. at 369, 391) without giving definite
preference to one or the other leave the reader in mid-air. For Kelsen's viewpoint
that justice is a political concept, see id. at 478, 527.
96 "I like to think that I never impose either a light sentence or a heavy
sentence, but rather a just sentence within the framework of the facts in this
case." Federal Judge Irving R. Kaufman in the Rosenberg-Greenglass case, N.
Y. Times, April 7, 1951, p. 6., col. 6.
97 Kelsen, Metamorphoses of the Idea of Justice in INTERPRETATIONS OF
MODERN LEGaL PH rLosoPHis 395 et seq. (Sayre ed. 1947).
98 E.g., ST. THOMAS, Sum-mA THEOLOGIAE; MESSNER, DAs NATURRECHTS
(1950). The same can be said of BRUNNER, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
(Hottingen's transl. 1945).
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men.99 There is, however, one general concept of a very
definite substance that stands out in the present struggle
between East and West: the dignity of individual man. If
this ancient Natural Law concept is recognized and accepted
by all nations, millions will no longer languish in labor
camps, nor will people be shipped in cattle cars at the whim
of governments. The Declaration of Human Rights '10 is a
step toward the realization of justice. No "Tribunal of
Science" can minimize the momentousness of this modern
document of Natural Law.
VI.
Conclusion
The utter helplessness in which Positivism had placed
German jurisprudence at the time Hitler came to power has
at last been recognized by German scholars. The late Ger-
man legal philosopher, Gustav Radbruch, stressed the neces-
sity of recognizing a "supra-legal law" in the light of which
the arbitrary and inhiman features of Nazi legislation would
retroactively be regarded as never possessing the force of
law.' 0 ' Such a proposition is by no means of mere theoreti-
cal significance. Jurisprudence, he said on another occasion,
ought to remember the age-old wisdom of antiquity, the
Middle Ages and the Enlightenment - that there is a
Natural Law under which "wrong remains wrong even
though it assumes the form of a law." 102
B. F. Wright, in his excellent study of the application of
Natural Law by American thinkers, indicated: 103
In order to prove that Natural Law is an outworn or
harmful concept it is necessary to do more than demonstrate
that it has sometimes been used harmfully.... It is necessary
99 For a brief discussion of some fundamental rules see Bodenheimer, supra
note 90, at 346 et seq.
100 General Assembly of United Nations, Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
101 RADBRUCH, VoRscHrUL DER REcHTsPBiLosoPHiE 108 (1947).
102 Radbruch, Die Erneuerung des Rechts in DIE WA-DLUNG 8 et seq. (1947).
103 WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 84, at 343.
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to show that political philosophy has no need of a concept
which is expressive of standards of rights and justice other
than, perhaps higher than, those set forth in the positive
laws....
Positivism still owes us this proof.
The dispute over universals has quieted down with the
passage of time. The concept of innate ideas and even the
moderate Realism of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas may
not appeal to many contemporary students of political
thought. But the need for a modern theory of Natural Law,
on whatever logical basis, is as great as ever. Perhaps the
Stoic compromise of Nominalism with its implanted ideas
was not so unreasonable after all.
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